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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
The challenges of building relations 
between two different civilizations, 
which Samuel Huntington and Lev Gu-
milev wrote about, are currently beco-
ming more obvious due to the cardinal 
geopolitical and geoeconomic changes 
that have taken place since the demise 
the USSR and the world socialist sys-
tem. Today, in the West, as if in con-
trast to the famous project by Charles 
de Gaulle —“Europe from the Atlantic 
to the Urals”, an extremely negative ima-
ge of Russia is being formed. Western 
ideologists stick to the axiom according 
to which despotism and slavery, alleg-
edly being the basis of Russia's internal 
order, inevitably give rise to aggression 
in relations with the outside world. Of 
course, these ideas do not take into ac-
count the ongoing socio-economic chan-
ges in the country and have little to do 
with modern realities. They are a mere 
reproduction of the old Western xeno-
phobic moods going back to the time 
when Russophobia was widely spread 
in a number of leading European coun-
tries. The article explores historical 
roots of Russophobia and their manifest-
tations at the beginning of the XXI cen-
tury in Poland and the Baltic countries. 
 
Keywords: inter-civilization splits, 
Russophobia, geopolitics, peaceful co-
existence, the Baltic region 
 
Samuel Huntington’s book “The 
Clash of Civilizations”1, often men-
tioned by political scientists and po-
litical geographers, as well as the 
                                                     
1 Huntington, S. 1996, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, New York. 
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work of Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov on intercivilizational relations and 
the formation of Eurasian civilization2, are, unfortunately, not fully com-
prehended. This is manifested in the desire to impose the authors’ view 
of the world, which is characteristic of a particular civilization. The pos-
sibility of a different attitudes to social processes is regarded as defective, 
impossible and requiring, at the very least, censure. Any deviation is con-
sidered unacceptable and immoral. A vivid manifestation of such an ap-
proach is the so-called Russophobia — an unjustifiably critical view of 
Russia, the Russians and their ethno-cultural, religious and national-state 
identity. In this sense, a number of authors propose to consider Rus-
sophobia one of the forms of xenophobia [1—8]. Today, the question of 
negative attitudes towards Russia is acquiring not only scientific but also 
political [9—19] and practical dimensions. 
In the 19th century, Russophobia as a phenomenon was spread quite 
widely. Similar sentiments in the West were connected with the active 
foreign policy of the Russian Empire aimed at preserving European mon-
archies and the political balance of power in Europe. Interference in the 
internal affairs of other states and Russia’s participation in all European 
wars led to Europe becoming fearful of Russia’s strengthening and her 
growing role in the European and therefore in the world order. The clash 
of the foreign policy interests of the Russian Empire in the Balkans and 
then in Central Asia with those of other European countries, especially 
Great Britain, led to aggressive political propaganda declaring the Rus-
sian people “barbarians and the cunning Asians”. 
In his time, the outstanding Russian thinker I. A. Ilyin in his article 
“The World Politics of Russian Sovereigns” listed the characteristic fea-
tures of the West’s attitude to Russia in the 19th century and described the 
existing in Europe set of “bad affects: fear, arrogance, enmity, envy and 
ignorant slander…”. A capacious, precise and expressive formulation by 
Ilyin explaining the essence of such an attitude can be summarized as fol-
lows: “Europeans ‘need’ a bad Russia: barbarous, so that it could be 
‘civilized’ in their own way; threatening with its size, so that it could be 
divided; expansionistic, so that a coalition against it could be created; 
reactionary, so that one could justify a revolution in it and demand a re-
public for it; religiously decomposing [highlighted by I. A. Ilyin] in or-
der to break into it with the propaganda of Reformation or Catholicism; 
economically untenable in order to claim its ‘unused’ space and its raw 
materials or at least to demand favorable trade agreements and conces-
sions. But if such a ‘rotten’ Russia could be strategically used, then the 
Europeans are ready to make alliances with it and to demand its partici-
pation in military actions “to the last drop of its blood” [20, p. 93]. 
                                                     
2 Gumilev, L. N. 1979—1980, Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli [Ethnogenesis and the 
Biosphere], Moscow, Vol. 1—3 (in Russ.).  
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Much of what I. A. Ilyin wrote and what gave rise to Russophobia as 
an ideological and political phenomenon retains its relevance nowadays. 
It is not by chance that the Russophobic policy, which took the form of 
Russiaphobia, intensified in the West and became actually the prevailing 
tendency when Russia had overcome the crisis of transition period and 
risen from its knees, when, by relying on its restored economy and re-
vived armed forces, it returned to the policy of defending its national in-
terests, which by no means always and completely coincide with those of 
the United States (which took the place of the 19th century Great Britain) 
and their Western allies. There are still attempts to ‘civilize’ Russia; if 
they fail, then to dismember or at least to internally divide her, to use our 
country’s resources in their own interests (let us recall the famous ‘project’ 
of Zbigniew Brzezinski to make Siberia a common Eurasian domain, sub-
ject to transnational efforts for its development and settlement3). 
At the same time, Russophobia (Russiaphobia) is greatly manifested 
in the foreign and domestic policies of not only the leading Western 
states (primarily the United States and Great Britain), but in particular in 
those of their Eastern European allies. It is primarily about the position of 
the current authorities of Poland and the Baltic States and their ideolo-
gists who were defined by German researchers back in 2007, that is be-
fore the events in Ukraine, as “soldiers of the Cold War” who are set to 
increase conflict with Russia4. 
 
The origins of Russophobia and our times 
 
According to F. I. Tyutchev, the basis for Russophobia is “a fiery, 
blind, cruel and hostile attitude… towards Russia” [21, p. 191]. From his 
point of view, the appearance of the image of Russia as a “monster” and 
“cannibal of the 19th century” [21, p. 176] in the public consciousness of 
Europeans was conditioned by a number of reasons: firstly, by deep civi-
lizational differences between Western and Eastern Europe (i. e. Russia); 
secondly, by the lack of understanding of the social system, a civilization 
that can replace the Western one: “The Western people who make judg-
ments about Russia are a bit like the Chinese making judgments about 
Europe, or rather the Greeks (Greculi) making judgments about Rome. 
This seems to be the law of history: never has any social system or any 
civilization manifested the understanding of that one which had to re-
place it…”; and thirdly, “moral irresponsibility” [21, p. 100, 182, 191]. 
Fourthly, Tyutchev also notes the instinctive nature of Russophobia, 
                                                     
3 Brzezinski, Z. 2004, Vybor. Globalnoe gospodstvo ili globalnoe liderstvo [The 
Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership], Moscow, p. 139—140 (in 
Russ.). 
4 Kulik, S. A. 2013, Rossiya v Baltijskom labirinte [Russia in the Baltic Laby-
rinth], Moscow, p. 26—27 (in Russ.). 
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which arises in Western society in the face of the material strength of 
Russia. This instinctive feeling is “something between respect and 
fear — the feeling of awe, which is held only in relation to the Power” 
[21, p. 100—101]. 
All these historical roots of Russophobia, alas, are relevant today; the 
only difference is that Russophobia is now acting mainly as Russiapho-
bia5. For all their similarities and common Christian roots, quite serious 
civilizational differences persist between Russia and the West, and it is 
obvious that the attempts of the West to mould Russia as they wish will 
not be successful. Moreover, these attempts are incomprehensible and un-
necessary — Japan is a very successful member of the geopolitical West 
in spite of the fact that in terms of mentality it is much further from the 
West than modern Russia. 
The source of Russophobia is also the fact that Russia, without aban-
doning modernization and innovation, at the same time remains loyal to 
historical traditions and values and is becoming one of the leaders of en-
lightened conservatism in the modern world. It is notable that a well-
known American politician and publicist Patrick Joseph Buchanan, fa-
mous for his conservative views, in his book “The Death of the West”6 
repeatedly mentions Russia and Russian realities and apparently consid-
ers our country a natural ally of the West if not a part of it. Russia is also 
turning into a leader of the conservative world in the eyes of a number of 
right-wing European politicians7. This, in turn, causes a negative, or if 
you wish, Russophobic reaction from the liberal-minded political circles 
of the United States and European countries, because Russia and attitudes 
to it and relations with it are becoming a factor of both the foreign and 
domestic policy, an instrument in the fight for votes. 
As in Tyutchev’s time, Russophobia rests on the same fear of the mil-
itary might of Russia, which is not only one of the two leading nuclear 
states but has also recently demonstrated, as we saw it in Syria, the ability 
to project power and achieve its geopolitical goals by using conventional 
weapons in opposition with the world’s leading geopolitical players. 
                                                     
5 In the modern outwardly politically correct and tolerant West it is not customa-
ry to demonize peoples, so now they demonize Russia as a state, hypocritically 
emphasizing that they have nothing against the Russian people. Still the essence 
of Russophobia remains the same; that is why in this paper we use this term for 
describing the modern period of time. 
6 Buchanan, P. J. 2003, Smert’ Zapada [The Death of the West], Moscow (in 
Russ.). 
7 Osipov, E. 2017, The Leader of the Conservative World, Izvestiya, March 7, 
2017, available at: https://iz.ru/news/669056 (accessed 12.10.2018) (in 
Russ.). 
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The economic growth in Russia, which after overcoming the transi-
tion crisis has become one of the world’s main centers of attraction and 
export of foreign capital, has also raised fears in the West. It is significant 
that in 2013, the year before the imposing of anti-Russian sanctions, the 
Russian Federation ranked third in the world in terms of inflows of for-
eign direct investment and fourth in their exports8. One should mention 
also the role of Russia as the world energy superpower, which plays a 
key or important role in the supply of energy to many countries of the 
world, primarily to Europe. 
One of the roots of the traditional and recently increasing Russopho-
bic policy of the United States, in which it involves the rest of the West, 
is the fear of a rapprochement between Russia and Europe. As noted by 
the well-known American political scientist and geopolitician George 
Friedman, “For generations, keeping the technological sophistication of 
Europe separated from the natural resources and manpower of Russia has 
been one of the key aims of American foreign policy”9. He emphasizes 
that “the unification of Russia and Europe would create a force whose 
population, technological and industrial capability, and natural resources 
would at the very least equal America’s, and in all likelihood outstrip 
them”. That is why, as noted by G. Friedman, “during the twentieth cen-
tury, the United States acted three times to prevent the kind of Russian-
German entente that could unify Eurasia and threaten fundamental Ame-
rican interests”. In his opinion, “the response of the United States to a 
Russian-German entente must be the same during the next ten years as it 
was in the twentieth century. The United States must continue to do eve-
rything it can to block a German-Russian entente and to limit the effect 
that Russia’s sphere of influence might have on Europe, because the very 
presence of a military powerful Russia changes the way Europe be-
haves.”10 
 
Objective factors of cooperation between Russia  
and Western Europe 
 
The current processes of confrontation contradict the fact that eco-
nomic and geographical factors determine the need for cooperation. 
Russia and Western Europe are objectively complementary and, ac-
cording to Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian 
Federation to the EU, “there is no reasonable alternative to cooperation 
                                                     
8 World Investments Report 2014, New York ; Geneva, p. XV. 
9 Friedman, G. 2011, Sledujushie 10 let [The Next Decade], Moscow, p. 20 (in 
Russ.). 
10 Friedman, G. Op. cit., p. 20. 
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and unification of potentials”11. Now we are talking mainly about the 
complementarity in the supply of raw materials (primarily energy) in ex-
change of finished goods, but in the future the complementarity of econ-
omies can also cover high-tech areas such as nuclear energy, aerospace 
and others. Certain groundwork in these fields has already been laid. In 
the long run, with the normalization of relations, a colossal industrial and 
raw material giant from “Lisbon to Vladivostok” can be created12. 
There are objective factors for the cooperation between Russia and its 
closest European neighbors, including such anti-Russian “Cold War sol-
diers” as Poland and the Baltic States. 
Dr. Leszek Sykulski, the author of the recently published book “Geo-
politics and Security of Poland”, who previously worked as an analyst on 
international security issues in the office of the President of Poland Lech 
Kaczynski, notes that Poland and Russia are doomed to cooperate be-
cause of geography itself13. And he is not alone in his views. Thus, Kor-
nel Morawiecki, who is the oldest deputy of the Polish Sejm and the fa-
ther of the current Prime Minister of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki, be-
lieves that Poland could become a natural bridge to the East for Western 
Europe and to the West for Russia14. For example, the pan-Eurasian 
transport system “The New Silk Road” proposed by China could become 
one of the promising projects that would benefit both Poland and Russia. 
However, largely because of Poland’s policy towards Russia, the trans-
portation of cargoes can be redirected round that country through Kali-
ningrad and St. Petersburg15. Ultimately, Warsaw would gain from the 
restoration of mutually beneficial pragmatic relations with Moscow, but 
in the first place it is the Russophobic emotions that impede that. Russia, 
                                                     
11 Chizov, V. 2017, Chizhov: otnoshenija Rossii i Evrosojuza ispitivajut deficit 
kanalov kommunikacii [Chizov: the EU-Russia Relations are Lacking in Com-
munication Channels], RIA Novosti, available at: https://ria.ru/politics/20171204/ 
1510182711.html (accessed 12.10.2018) (in Russ.). 
12 Yakunin, V. I. 2013, Political and Economic Competitiveness of Europe and 
Russia: Possible Synergies, Sravnitelnaya Politika, No. 1 (11), p. 77—78 (in 
Russ.). 
13 Khavich, O. 2018, Polsha i Rossija: Soyuz pochti ne viden [Poland and Rus-
sia: Union almost out of Sight], Ukraina.ru, available at: https://ukraina.ru/ex 
clusive/20181004/1021310602.html (accessed 12.10.2018) (in Russ.). 
14 Morawiecki, K. 2018, Kornel Morawiecki: improvement of Polish-Russian 
relations for the benefit of the world peace [Kornel Morawiecki: Uluchshenie 
otnoshenij Polshi i Rossii v interesah mira], RIA Novosti, available at: 
https://ria.ru/interview/20180703/1523789744.html (accessed 12.10.2018) (in 
Russ.). 
15 New Silk Road may not go through Poland [Novij Sholkovij put’ mozhet bit 
prolozhen v obhod Polshi], Radio Polsha, 15.05.2018, available at: http://www. 
radiopolsha.pl/6/138/Artykul/363551 (accessed 12.10.2018) (in Pol.). 
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however, is not going to respond in the same manner. As stated by Rus-
sian Foreign Minister S. V. Lavrov: “We have been included in the cate-
gory of enemies; we will not reciprocate, although we see that Russopho-
bia is being consciously, consistently and on a large scale planted in Po-
land as a national idea”. The Minister assured that if Poland understands 
that a dialogue can only be based on mutual consideration of interests, 
Russia will be ready for dialogue with Poland16. 
The Russophobic policy of the leadership of the Baltic States seems 
to be even more irrational compared to that of Poland, since due to the 
history, geographical location and economic development features Lithu-
ania, Latvia and Estonia even more badly need normal relations with the 
Russian Federation. The curtailment of previously uneven economic rela-
tions with Russia — first of all the cessation of cargo transit through the 
Baltic ports as well as the support of anti-Russian sanctions imposed by 
the European Union seriously hurt their economies. The attempts to 
abandon Russian energy supplies will force them to incur higher costs for 
the purchase of liquefied natural gas from other countries, as has already 
happened to Lithuania. The Baltic States, pursuing Russophobic policies 
both internally and externally, seem to have almost missed the chance 
given by geography and history to become a transit territory (or “gateway 
region” in the terminology of the American geopolitics scholar, Saul Co-
hen) between Russia and Europe. According to S. Cohen, the main func-
tion of the regions, which he considered ‘the gateways’, is the stabiliza-
tion of the world geopolitical system, the stimulation of global economic 
and political interaction and international cooperation17. In fact, the Baltic 
Sea region is rapidly becoming (if it has not already become) a zone of 
confrontation, a kind of “new powder keg” of Europe like the Balkans at 
the beginning of the last century, an economically depressed margin of 
Europe losing its population as a result of mass migration (especially 
youth). The blame for that should be put, above all, on the anti-Russian 
Russophobic policy pursued by the ruling elites of these countries. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the modern world Russophobia appears, above all, as Russia-
phobia, that is hostility towards Russia as a state, its foreign and domestic 
policy. It is a reflection of the strategy of the West which seeks (and not 
                                                     
16 Lavrov: Polsha zapisala RF v kategoriju vragov, Moskva ne budet otvechat’ 
vzaimnostju [Lavrov: Poland Believes Russia is an Enemy, the Feeling is not 
Mutual], Tass, Russian News Agency, Jan. 15, 2018, available at: https://tass. 
ru/politika/4874070 (accessed: 12.10.2018) (in Russ.). 
17 Kolosov, V., Mironenko, G. 2001, Geopolitika: uchebnik dlia vuzov [Geopoli-
tics: a university handbook], Мoscow, p. 109—110 (in Russ.).  
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for the first time since the times of tsarism) to oppose the “bad Russian 
authorities” to the majority of the population, to whom (say the support-
ers of this policy) they are friendly and seek to help them live in prosperi-
ty, freedom and democracy of the Western type. It is indicative, however, 
that “bad” are any authorities in Russia, which try to defend Russian na-
tional interests and do not allow the Western states to pursue their own 
economic and geopolitical ends in relation to our country — regardless of 
whether it is the tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet capitalist rule. Perhaps, the 
only exception is the period from the end of “perestroika” until the mid-
1990s, when the West supported first M. S. Gorbachev’s policy and then 
B. N. Yeltsin’s. It is not worth mentioning that this policy resulted in the 
collapse of the USSR, the economic crisis and the significant loss of Rus-
sia’s previous geopolitical positions. The population, with a few ex-
ceptions, for which Western ideologists of the transition to democracy 
and market advocated so much, was plunged into deprivation and pov-
erty, which was overcome only after a serious adjustment of the econom-
ic and political course. All this makes us at least be wary of the game of 
contrasts “the bad authorities — the unfortunate Russian people”. 
Russophobia is not so much ethnophobia as the tool that the West led 
by the United States is using to prevent the restoration of Russia as a 
great world power that occupies a rightful place among the leading play-
ers in global politics and economy. It is not by chance that Russophobia 
is declining when Russia is weak and when it is possible to try to ma-
nipulate her. When these attempts fail, the West turns back to Russopho-
bic policy, as it happened in 2003—2004 when “color revolutions” began 
to spread in the post-Soviet space. 
Russophobia as ideological and political tool is used not only by great 
powers, such as the USA or EU leading countries, but also by the coun-
tries of the second (Poland) and third (Baltic States) echelons. In this case 
we are talking about using Russophobia and whipping it up in order to 
act as privileged partners of the first-echelon Western countries to benefit 
from this partnership economically and politically. At the same time, in 
Poland and especially in the Baltic States, Russophobia to a much greater 
extent than in the “Old West” exists not just as a tool, but as ethnophobia, 
i. e. hostility towards Russians as an ethnicity but towards Russia as a 
state. 
It seems that it is possible and necessary to counteract Russophobia 
through an active information campaign abroad (an example of such a 
successful campaign is the work of the RT TV channel), support for pro-
Russian parties, public associations, politicians, activists and the grass-
roots as well as through the formation of pro-Russian lobbies in the lead-
ing Western countries (primarily in the United States), the promotion of 
contacts of ordinary people (the recent World Cup 2018 in Russia played 
a huge positive role in this sense), etc. In other words, it is necessary to 
activate all possible mechanisms of “soft power”, which now, in our 
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opinion, are not used by Russia in full or are insufficiently coordinated. 
An important positive role in overcoming Russophobia in the Baltic Sea 
region can and should be the active participation of Russian regions, gov-
ernmental and non-governmental institutions in the programs and pro-
jects of cross-border and trans-border cooperation both on a bilateral and 
multilateral bases (primarily with the EU). We believe that cooperation at 
the local and regional level will gradually contribute to overcoming mis-
trust and to improving relations at higher levels of interaction between 
Russia, individual countries of Western Europe (including the Baltic Sea 
region) and the EU as a whole. 
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